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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

the automobile collision situation, where other policy considerations
control.
The Court stated, inter alia, that the insurer should not "be
required to make an election between its defense to the main
action and its subrogation rights." 39 Furthermore, other features
of the CPLR, such as severances, stays or separate trials, would
provide an adequate remedy for the insured-should its rights
be prejudiced in any way.40
While the instant case clearly indicates that the Ross rule
vill be undisturbed in the automobile collision situation, it seems
apparent that impleader will now be available in virtually all
subrogation situations. CPLR 1007 will still remain, however,
the ward of judicial discretion.41
CPLR 1007.: Court refuses to allow cause of action for implied
indemnity where no common basis of liability exists.
In

Fladerer v.

Needleman,42 the appellate

division,

third

department, held that a vendor had no cause of action for implied
indemnity against her attorney "not merely because of the failure
to demonstrate an active-passive negligence situation but because
...the contract vendor and her former lawyer occupy no common
basis of liability to the contract vendee." 43
Vendor brought suit against her contract vendee for repudiation
of their contract and the vendee counterclaimed on the ground
that the vendor's title was unmarketable. Consequently the vendor
impleaded her attorney whom she alleged was primarily liable
for any damages on vendee's counterclaim. The attorney interposed the statute of limitations to bar the third party action,
but the lower court rejected this defense since an action for
indemnity "accrues not at the time of the commission of the tort...
but at the time of the payment of the judgment. . . ." 44
The appellate division sustained this conclusion, but refused to
allow the vendor's cause of action for implied indemnity, because
the counterclaim rested on contract and the third party complaint
rested on negligence. Moreover, there was a failure to demonstrate
an active-passive negligence situation. One suspects that the court's
somewhat restrictive view of implied indemnity was prompted by
a desire to protect the lawyer from possibly becoming, in its words,
an insurer of title.
39 22 N.Y.2d at 156, 239 N.F.2d at 180, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
Id. at 153, 239 N.E.2d at 178, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
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41See genzerally 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 1007, supp. commentary 56-60
(1968).
4230 App. Div. 2d 371, 292 N.Y.S.2d 277 (3d Dep't 1968).
43 Id. at 375, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
44Id.
at 373, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 278.

